

AJP-3.4

NON-ARTICLE 5 CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS

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MARCH 2005

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
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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
NATO STANDARDIZATION AGENCY (NSA)
NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

March 2005

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FOREWORD

0001. Doctrine is a framework of principles, practices, and procedures, the understanding of which provides a common basis for action. It evolves as its political and strategic foundation changes, and in the light of new technology and capabilities, the lessons of experience, and the insights of operational analysis. Doctrine forms the fundamental principles by which North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgement in application.

0002. Allied joint operations are military operations conducted by Alliance directed, NATO-led, forces composed of more than one nation and Service. The goal of Allied joint operations is to achieve assigned objectives through the sequenced and synchronised employment of all forces assigned.

0003. Although NATO doctrine is intended for NATO and NATO-led forces, it could be applied within the framework of an ad-hoc coalition force. NATO doctrine could also be utilised, with adaptations where necessary, and agreed by participating nations, for coalition operations of NATO and non-NATO nations. Allied Joint Publications (AJPs), NATO Standardisation Agreements, and other publications foster interoperability between NATO nations. Many of the subjects covered in these documents may have to be reconsidered when planning operations with participation of Partners and other non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations.

0004. The purpose of AJP-3.4, *Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations*, is to discuss the principles and various types of non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5CROs), and highlight those NA5CRO considerations relevant to the successful conduct of operations. In particular, this publication highlights the sensitivity to political considerations, and the prominent role of non-military entities, both governmental and non-governmental.

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0005. NA5CROs can be described as multifunctional operations which encompass those political, military and civil activities, initiated and executed in accordance with international law, including international humanitarian law, contributing to conflict prevention and resolution, and crisis management in the pursuit of declared Alliance objectives. They range from support operations that are primarily associated with civil agencies through operations in support of peace to Alliance combat operations. Alliance forces could additionally perform extraction operations, and tasks in support of disaster relief and of humanitarian, search and rescue, or non-combatant evacuation operations (evacuation of nationals remaining under national responsibility).

0006. NA5CROs may be as demanding and intense as Article 5 operations and could require the use of the complete array of the Alliance's assets and capabilities. Given the limits of the military resources available to the Alliance to address the risks and threats to the security in the Euro-Atlantic area, the Alliance's ability to undertake NA5CROs must remain based on the same military capabilities required for Collective Defence operations. NATO has outlined Essential Operational Capabilities in MC 400/2, *MC Guidance for the Military Implementation of Alliance Strategy*, which apply to all Alliance military missions, including NA5CROs. Operations that involve the use of military force or the threat of force include military action ranging from sanction and embargo enforcement to military combat operations.

0007. NATO NA5CRO policy and doctrine continue to evolve. Accordingly, lessons learned from recent and current NA5CROs will be documented, validated, and incorporated into future revisions. At least for the foreseeable future, AJP-3.4, *Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations*, should be considered a "living document" that could be amended as required.

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0008. AJP-3.4, *Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations*, is focused on the operational level, which is the level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within an operational area. Activities at the operational level link strategy and tactics by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. This publication is primarily intended for use by NATO Joint Force Commanders and staffs of joint forces.

0009. Within the hierarchy of AJP, AJP-3.4 is:

- a. Directly subordinate to AJP-3, *Allied Joint Operations*, which describes the fundamental operational aspects of joint operations and provides guidance on conducting joint operations;
- b. The higher level to AJP-3.4.1, *Peace Support Operations*, which develops and describes the NATO doctrine for peace support operations;
- c. The higher level to AJP-3.4.2, *Non-combatant Evacuation Operations*.

CHAPTER 1

OVERVIEW OF NON-ARTICLE 5 CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS

0101. **Introduction.** The need for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to be capable of responding to a crisis beyond the concept of “Collective Defence” under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty was identified at the 1999 Washington Summit. The Washington Summit recognised that future NATO involvement in non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5CROs) needed to be more flexible, committed to collective defence and able to undertake new missions including contributing to effective conflict prevention and engaging actively in crisis management. NA5CROs are a major part of the Alliance’s contribution to effective crisis management. Their purpose is to conduct missions that contribute to international peace and security. NA5CROs are intended to respond to such crises, to include the containment of hostilities, in a timely and co-ordinated manner where these crises could either affect the security of NATO nations, or threaten stability and lead to conflict on the periphery of the Alliance. NA5CROs encompass the Alliance’s conduct of and participation in the full range of operations to include those in support of peace, which could range from the most demanding types of peace enforcement to military preventative activities, and others as directed by the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

0102. NATO Military Operations

a. Article 5 Collective Defence

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- (1) NATO member nations participate fully within the Alliance and are equally committed to the terms of the Washington Treaty, particularly to the reciprocal undertaking made in Article 5—namely to consider an attack from an external enemy against one or more of them as an attack upon them all. This is known as “Collective Defence.” The Parties will assist the Party or Parties attacked by taking forthwith such action, as they deem necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
- (2) The role of the NATO integrated military structure is to provide the organisational framework for defending the territory of member nations against threats to their security and stability, in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, the development of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative and the Alliance’s role in Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and other fields have meant that the integrated military structure has been called upon to undertake other tasks as well.

b. Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations

- (1) NATO activities falling outside the scope of Article 5 are referred to collectively as “NA5CROs.” One principal difference between Article 5 operations and NA5CROs is that there is no formal obligation for NATO nations to take part in a NA5CRO while in case of an Article 5 operation, NATO nations are formally committed to take the actions they deem necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

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- (2) NA5CROs range from support operations primarily associated with civil agencies through operations in support of peace¹, to Alliance combat operations. In the framework of a NATO-led operation, Alliance forces could additionally conduct extraction operations, and tasks in support of disaster relief and humanitarian operations, search and rescue (SAR) or support to non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs). Operations that involve the use of military force or the threat of force include military action ranging from sanction and embargo enforcement to military combat operations. Military Committee (MC) 327/2, *NATO Military Policy for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations*, establishes the guidance for conducting NA5CROs within the Alliance. Specific NA5CRO missions are addressed in detail in chapters 3 and 4.
- (3) The Alliance principle of collective effort is reflected in practical arrangements that enable the Allies to capitalise on the military advantage of collective defence without depriving the Allies of their sovereignty. These arrangements also enable NATO forces to conduct NA5CROs and constitute a prerequisite for a coherent Alliance response to all possible contingencies – including the possibility of stationing and deploying NATO forces outside home territory when required. NA5CROs will generally be limited in objective, means, area, and time depending on the desired end state. Depending on the situation, NA5CROs may be as demanding and intense as Article 5 operations, in particular during enforcement operations.

0103. **Principles of Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations.** The principles for the conduct of joint and multinational campaigns² apply to the conduct of NA5CROs. Furthermore, given the wide range of potential tasks within the NA5CRO spectrum, a different emphasis may be required for each campaign. The judgement of those responsible for planning and executing a mission will temper the weight and the application of the normal generic principles. An understanding of the relationships between these principles is essential for the effective management of civil-military interactions and the achievement of the desired end state. The specific application of the commonly accepted doctrinal concepts and principles as they are applied to NA5CROs are described below:

- a. **Objective.** Every campaign must be directed towards a clearly stated and attainable end state. In a joint and multinational campaign, involving many civilian organisations and agencies, military strategic objectives may be milestones along the way to achieving the desired political end state or an element of that end state.
- b. **Perseverance.** Achieving the desired political end state of an NA5CRO will require a patient, resolute and persistent pursuit of objectives. The pursuit of short-term military success should be balanced against the longer-term social, economic, environmental, and political consequences.
- c. **Unity of Command.** Unity of command, based on NATO principles and arrangements for command and control, is a non-negotiable principle within NATO. Unity of command requires clearly defined authorities, roles, and relationships to accomplish assigned tasks.

¹ In the Political/Strategic documents these operations are described as operations in support of peace. The Doctrinal Community refers to these operations as PSOs.

² In this context, campaigns may include major operations.

- d. **Unity of Effort.** Unity of effort recognises the need for a coherent approach to a common objective between the various military contingents and between the military and civilian components of any operation. Co-operation between military and civil elements requires continual military interaction with a large number of International Organisations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Effective liaison at all levels and regular conferences and meetings involving all agencies and parties is essential in achieving unity of effort.
- e. **Credibility.** A NATO-led force must be credible. A force must respond with professional bearing and swift, effective reactions to incidents. Establishing credibility is essential for building confidence and a co-ordinated Information Operations (INFO OPS) plan will be one of the elements in achieving this. While a force should not appear to pose a direct threat as long as compliance exists, there must be no doubt that a force is fully capable of carrying out its responsibilities and has the will to coerce if required to do so.
- f. **Transparency of Operations.** The mission and concept of operations as well as political/military end states must be readily understood and obvious to all parties and agencies. Achieving a common understanding will remove suspicion and mistrust. Information should be gathered and communicated through open sources wherever possible. While transparency of operations, including media access, should be the general rule, it must be balanced against the need to ensure the security of the mission and its members.
- g. **Protection.** Force protection (FP) is a command responsibility in all-military operations. FP needs to be taken into account when planning the size and composition of the force and when drawing up military plans, orders and Rules of Engagement (ROE). In the NAC Initiating Directive, the Joint Force Commander (JFC) may be given specific responsibilities for the protection of certain civilian agencies involved in the joint operations area (JOA).
- h. **Flexibility.** The successful conduct of an NA5CRO involves the management of change and the eventual transition to a stable environment. Within the Operation Plan (OPLAN) and the constraints of the ROE, the JFC should be given maximum operational flexibility, and the forces should be able to adapt and move from one activity to another at short notice and with the minimum of outside assistance. A NATO-led force needs to be balanced and independent in terms of skills, capabilities, equipment, and logistics.
- i. **Promotion of Co-operation and Consent.** The promotion of co-operation and consent amongst the parties are pre-requisites for many NA5CROs. Before execution, any military force activity, which may result in a loss of consent, should be carefully balanced and assessed against the long-term objectives of the operation. This may be achieved through careful co-ordination of national agendas, and enhanced consultation and co-operation.
- j. **Impartiality.** Where the nature of the mission allows, operations should be conducted impartially without favour or prejudice to any party. Effective communications and transparency of operations are key to maintaining an even-handed approach.

- k. **Use of Force.** The potential use of force affects every aspect of a mission and requires continual review to accomplish the mission. In all cases, the use of force must be in accordance with the provisions of International Law, including international humanitarian law, and the politically approved amplifying guidance attached to the ROE. With respect to mission accomplishment, the degree of force used must be no more than that necessary to carry out duties and accomplish assigned objectives of the mission. Force used must be limited to the degree, intensity, and duration necessary to achieve the objective. ROE do not limit the inherent right of self-defence. Self-defence is the use of such necessary and proportional force, including deadly force, by NATO/NATO-led forces and personnel to defend themselves against attack or an imminent attack.³
- l. **Mutual Respect.** In many NA5CROs, the respect in which an Allied Joint Force (AJF) is held will be a direct consequence of its professional conduct and how it treats the local population and recognised authorities. Through a United Nations (UN) mandate, Status of Forces Agreements or other special agreements, the AJF may enjoy certain immunities related to its duties. Notwithstanding this, its members must respect the laws and customs of the host-nation and must be seen to be doing so. The JFC should also ensure the same principles are recognised and implemented amongst the different national, cultural and ethnic elements within the formations which make up the force. All personnel must consistently demonstrate the highest standards of discipline exercised through controlled and professional behaviour on and off duty.
- m. **Freedom of Military Movement.** Freedom of military movement is essential for the successful accomplishment of any NA5CRO. The mandate and the ROE must allow the AJF to remain free at all times to perform its duties throughout the designated mission area without interference from any of the local factions. Experience indicates that various factions will often try to impose local restrictions on freedom of movement. These restrictions must be firmly and swiftly resolved initially through negotiation, but if necessary, through more vigorous and resolute action up to and including the use of force.
- n. **Legitimacy.** The legitimacy of the operation will be a crucial factor for drawing support within the international community, contributing nations and the involved parties, including the civil community. The participation of Partners and other non-NATO countries in a NATO-led campaign would broaden the basis of international support. It is therefore necessary that NA5CROs be executed in accordance with all applicable international law, including the principles of the UN Charter. Accusations against the AJF, which could compromise its legal position, can be more easily refuted if the force's intentions and activities are made clear and are transparent to the international community and involved parties.

0104. **Political Control.** The UN and Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) are organisations that have political, economic, cultural, or military relationships with NATO member nations. NATO has offered to support, on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with its own procedures, PSOs and other operations under the authority of the UN or responsibility of the OSCE including making Alliance resources and expertise available. NA5CROs will only be conducted under the political control and strategic direction of the NAC. It demands close co-operation and co-ordination between the highest political and military bodies within the Alliance and close consultation with Partners when they are involved.

³ See paragraph 0213 and MC 362/1, *NATO Rules of Engagement*, for further information on the use of force.

a. United Nations

- (1) The first purpose of the UN, as stated in its Charter, is “to maintain international peace and security.” The Charter provides the terms of reference for the various elements of the UN, and for regional arrangements under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, and agencies in fulfilling this responsibility. The purpose and principles of the Charter as well as three of the four Chapters, which establish the specific power granted to the UN Security Council (UNSC) for the discharge of its duties, refer in their content to military missions like NATO NA5CROs. Whilst the UN does not talk about crisis response it does talk about complex political emergencies. These are described as a humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country programme. Chapters discussing emergencies are Chapter VI, which deals with the pacific settlement of disputes, Chapter VII, which refers to action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, and Chapter VIII, that deals with regional arrangements. It is important to note that Articles 42, 52, 53, and 54 of Chapter VII are the references for taking action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.
- (2) Within the UN, the UNSC is the body responsible for maintaining international peace and security and emergency responses are usually authorised through resolutions of the UNSC. Alliance support of, or involvement in, a UN operation must be within the context of the UN Charter and will be negotiated between the UN Secretariat, the UNSC, the NAC, and national governments.
- (3) Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has undergone a number of significant changes in the way it performs peace operations and more broadly, crisis management. Experiences over the past several years have resulted in a review of methods and capabilities. Additionally, the UN has recognised, in line with Chapter VIII of its Charter, that it may need to seek the assistance of regional or other organisations or ad hoc alliances, with specific operational capabilities. At the strategic level, the Secretary General’s Peace and Security Executive Committee, consisting of the Under Secretary Generals for Political Affairs and Peacekeeping (PK), the Emergency Relief Co-ordinator, and the representative of the High Commissioner for Human Rights have met as required to review crisis situations.

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b. Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

- (1) The OSCE, as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, is the most inclusive security organisation in Europe. The organisation also includes Canada and the United States and plays an essential role in promoting peace and stability, enhancing co-operative security, and advancing democracy and human rights in Europe. The OSCE is particularly active in the fields of preventive diplomacy, contributing to conflict prevention, crisis management, human rights, and post-conflict rehabilitation. The OSCE has, since the early 1990s, mandated a number of observation and monitoring missions. Since its inception, the OSCE has worked to reduce international tension and for the establishment of arms reduction and arms control measures. The OSCE has also developed some procedures and institutions to promote peaceful settlements under the UN Charter.
- (2) Increasingly, there is a general understanding that regional conflicts, in principle, should be addressed by regional organisations. As a regional arrangement, the OSCE has made clear its willingness to participate in, or conduct, operations under Chapter VI of the UN Charter in appropriate situations. The Charter for European Security, adopted at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul, encompasses the development of the OSCE role in PK and other operations. According to this Charter, the OSCE can offer support to, and request support from other organisations and/or States for conducting PK and other operations on its behalf.

c. European Union

- (1) The European Union (EU) is a treaty-based, institutional framework that defines and manages economic and political cooperation among its European member countries.
- (2) The Maastricht Treaty on EU, which took effect in November 1993, was a major overhaul of the founding treaties and created the “three pillar” EU as it exists today.
 - Pillar One incorporates the founding treaties and sets out the institutional requirements for Economic and Monetary Union. It also provides for supplementary powers in certain areas, e.g., environment, research, education and training.
 - Pillar Two establishes the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that makes it possible for the EU to take joint action in foreign and security affairs.
 - Pillar Three creates the Justice and Home Affairs policy, dealing with asylum, immigration, judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters, and customs and police cooperation against terrorism, drug trafficking, and fraud.
- (3) The Treaty of Amsterdam, which took effect on May 1, 1999, strengthened the CFSP and the EU's ability to undertake joint foreign policy actions.

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- (4) The Treaty of Nice, signed in February 2001 and implemented in January 2003, created permanent political and military structures for the European Security and Defence Policy. Under the Berlin plus arrangements, NATO will provide for recourse to collectively funded NATO assets and capabilities. For autonomous operations, the European military chain of command is based, on request, on a voluntary contribution from the member states at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
- (5) The military implications of the EU are a subject of ongoing discussions within NATO.

0105. Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

- a. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) brings together the NATO Allies and the Partner Nations in a forum providing for regular consultation and co-operation. It meets periodically at the Ambassador and Foreign and Defence Minister level.
- b. EAPC activities are based on a two-year action plan that focuses on consultation and co-operation on a range of political and security-related matters, including regional issues, arms control, international terrorism, PK, defence economic issues, civil emergency planning, and scientific and environmental issues.
- c. The EAPC acts as a political “umbrella” for PfP and offers both Allies and Partners a forum in which to exchange views on common security issues.
- d. NATO developed the PfP initiative with the goal of increasing stability and security throughout Europe. PfP is a process that brings NATO Allies and Partners together in a programme of joint defence and security-related activities, ranging from the purely military to defence-related co-operation in areas such as crisis management, civil emergency planning, air traffic management, or armaments co-operation. PfP is a permanent feature of the European security architecture.
- e. One significant achievement of the EAPC has been the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre (EADRCC) at NATO Headquarters (HQ). The EADRCC plays a significant role in co-ordinating humanitarian relief in the course of crises such as the flood-hit parts of the western Ukraine in 1999

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CHAPTER 2

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS OF NON-ARTICLE 5 CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS

0201. **Introduction.** The characteristics of each NA5CRO will determine the force size, structure and components, and its essential capabilities and sustainment requirements. The following operational considerations are focused on NA5CROs within the Alliance.

0202. **Participation**

- a. A nation's level of participation in an NA5CRO may vary in relation to its national strategic interest in the operation and resources available; therefore, national commitment to provide forces will vary accordingly and will affect the force generation process. In the case of NA5CROs, the principle of consensus remains valid; however, once consensus is achieved, it is each member state's prerogative to decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether it will commit forces and/or capabilities to the operation or not and what level of forces it may commit.
- b. When planning NA5CROs, initially only forces under the purview of NATO will be considered as the basis for force generation. However, Partners and other non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations (NNTCNs) will be considered as soon as authorised to make the best use of their individual strengths and unique capabilities. Their participation is likely to be determined, on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with modalities established for NNTCN participation in NA5CROs as approved by the NAC.
- c. The Political Military Framework (PMF) for NATO-led PfP operations was established in light of important Partner contributions and participation to NA5CROs. The PMF ensures that Partners joining future NATO-led operations are afforded appropriate opportunities to contribute to the provision of political guidance for and oversight over such operations.
- d. While an initial force estimate may be made from the reconnaissance and mission analysis, it is during the concept development stage that identification of the required military capabilities, numbers, generic grouping and the command structure (joint) support forces and facilities are completed. This information becomes the JFC's Statement of Requirement (SOR). The SOR is used as the basis of the NATO Force Generation Process through which force contributions will be sought from member nations. In the Force Generation Process the capabilities needed for the operation are selected from the air, land, maritime, space, and special operations forces at NATO's disposal on the basis of national capabilities and agreements to provide specific forces. Force generation should take into account the full range of force elements required, including supporting arms offering combined/joint capability.

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0203. Command and Control⁴

- a. The NAC provides continuous political control and strategic direction for all NATO-led military operations to include:
 - (1) Guidance in an Initiating Directive issued through the MC to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR)
 - (2) Approving the Allied HQ, and notation of a designated commander to conduct the operation
 - (3) Tasking relevant NATO bodies to develop a range of crisis management measures
- b. The MC:
 - (1) Advises the NAC on military implementation of an Initiating Directive
 - (2) Responds to supplementary NAC directives
 - (3) Develops military planning guidance
 - (4) Participates in liaison activities between the Alliance and other security organisations
 - (5) Recommends to the NAC the Allied HQ, and approves a commander for conducting operations
- c. SACEUR, when appropriate:
 - (1) Develops operational planning documents
 - (2) Recommends a NATO HQ and commander for conducting operations
 - (3) Identifies resource, finance, and expertise required to implement the NAC Initiating Directive
 - (4) Develops an OPLAN
 - (5) Develops Host Nation Support (HNS) arrangements between NATO and HNs when required
 - (6) When authorised, co-ordinates directly with Nations providing forces for an operation

⁴ Based on MCM-206-01, the Military Co-operation Working Group (MCWG) on Strategic Issues (SI) is currently considering the way ahead on NATO Command Arrangements (NCA). As step one, an MC Report on NCA is being developed taking into account the C2 capabilities available to the Alliance for the entire mission spectrum. The outcome of this report will certainly influence para 0203.

- (7) When authorised, establishes liaison with appropriate military, political-military, and civil organisations as necessary
- d. Command and Control (C2) capabilities are provided through a combination of the NATO Command Structure (NCS), including its Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) HQ capability, and the NATO Force Structure (NFS) C2 deployable and static assets and capabilities, mission tailored, optimised and best suited to the challenges of a specific mission. C2 arrangements for Allied joint operations, either Article 5 or NA5CRO, must consider the level of command as well as the geographic location of the operation and any required augmentation. At the strategic level, SACEUR assumes the overall command of the operation and exercises his responsibilities from HQ, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe. At the operational level, a joint force command would normally be provided by a joint HQ, operating either from its static HQ or as a deployable CJTF HQ.
 - (1) **Internal.** Internal Allied joint operations are operations in which the preponderance of the operational area lies within NATO territory.
 - (2) **Adjacent.** Adjacent Allied joint operations are operations in which the preponderance of the operational area lies outside but close to NATO's boundaries.
 - (3) **External.** External Allied joint operations are operations in which the operational area is beyond the periphery of NATO territory and the practical reach of the permanent NCS.⁵
- e. At the strategic level, SACEUR recommends the precise C2 architecture for each operation. There should be a seamless continuity in the joint command, running from planning through to the execution of the campaign plan. The detailed task organisation for an AJF is likely to be designed by the JFC. It is envisioned that forces will be subordinated normally to the JFC through the appropriate Component Commander (CC), or in accordance with the JFC's operational design. This flexibility is a key element in any C2 architecture. There may be a requirement, particularly for adjacent or external NATO operations, for the JFC to deploy a forward command element to a JOA.
- f. The Alliance has three operational level standing joint HQs: two land-based JFC HQs and one sea-based Joint HQ. These HQs are manned, appropriately sized, and able to initiate joint operations during initial and sustainment stages. The three Joint HQs allow for the implementation of the CJTF tailored capability—the ability to conduct concurrent CJTF operations, one commanded by a sea-based CJTF HQ and one commanded by a land-based CJTF HQ for the initial and sustainment stages.

⁵ Placeholder until agreement on MCWG (SI)-022-01.

- (1) The two land-based JFC HQs each have the capability to simultaneously command a joint operation from their static location and act as parent HQ for a land-based CJTF HQ. One land-based CJTF HQ can be generated from the two JFC HQs, with one JFC HQ acting as parent HQ to initiate the CJTF operation (supported by the other JFC HQ if required) and both JFC HQs sharing the responsibility for sustainment of the land-based CJTF HQ. They have the capability to run other operations from their static location. These JFC HQs are also suited to relieve the sea-based CJTF HQ in the sustainment stage.
 - (2) The sea-based Joint HQ is composed of two complementary elements: the parent HQ for a sea-based CJTF HQ that provides the nucleus staff, is embarked on its afloat command platform and a European-based Joint HQ that acts as the supporting HQ for the sea-based CJTF HQ. SACEUR commands both complementary elements. The parent Joint HQ allows for a rotation deployment of the sea-based CJTF HQ.
 - (3) The land-based JFC HQs have subordinate land, maritime, and air component HQs. To fulfil operational requirements, the CCs could be placed under the command of any of the three joint commanders, as ordered by SACEUR and determined by the mission.
- g. At the tactical level, the CC HQs plan and execute operations within an overall campaign. The CC HQs provide the Service-specific expertise for the JHQs. In operations they may form the JFCC HQ. JFCCs exercise their responsibilities from static or deployed HQ, depending on the characteristics and requirements of the operation.
- h. NATO Response Force. The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a part of the NFS⁶ and is designed to operate in high intensity conflicts. It has secure deployable communications, protection for nuclear, chemical, and biological emergencies, precision-strike capabilities, and sufficient air and sealift mobility. The NRF may be deployed to internal, adjacent, or external operational areas. To be able to sustain high-intensity operations on its own for a period and to be able to act, if necessary, as a bridgehead for a much larger mission, the NRF is tailored according to the situation drawing on pre-identified land, maritime, and air-components that will be deployed depending upon the nature of the mission.
- i. Liaison Teams. The principal function of the Liaison Teams is to establish personal contact with the other command HQs and authorities. Such liaison teams could include all the normal military-to-military exchanges as well as internationally mandated organisations, governments, and NGOs.

⁶ See MC 317/1, *The NATO Force Structure*, for further information.

0204. **The Estimate.** The military estimate should evaluate the potential for opposition to the operation. Unless the environment is hostile, the categorisation of potential opponents as the “enemy” could adversely affect the conduct of the military mission. Historically, in a campaign there is one designated adversary and one centre of gravity (COG). In NA5CROs, experience has shown that the identification of more than one COG per level of operation (including those of third parties such as NGOs) may be appropriate, and, in some cases, a COG may need protection rather than being neutralised or destroyed as is common in more conventional operations. Additionally, while the AJF mission is focused on achieving the conditions leading to a successful end state, its own COG analysis and evaluation may necessitate specific protection measures.

0205. **Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defence.** Across the whole spectrum of conflict, including NA5CROs, in addition to the potential for NBC attack, there may be a risk of release of harmful substances from damaged industrial facilities or nuclear installations. Expanding urbanisation and global distribution of nuclear, biological and chemical industries and materials increases the possibilities of the release of Toxic Industrial Materials into the environment as a result of neglect, natural disaster, deliberate action or collateral damage in the course of military operations. Therefore, NATO forces must be prepared to conduct operations in an NBC environment as a result of this and other types of releases other than attack. Detailed guidance regarding planning issues and operational implications can be found in AJP-3.8, *Allied Joint Doctrine for NBC Defence*.

0206. **Intelligence**

- a. In many emerging crisis situations, the most demanding and critical NATO intelligence task will be to provide strategic indications and warning of emerging security risks and to support co-ordinated political, diplomatic actions, and military operations to restore stability and frame enduring political solutions. During crisis management and intervention, decentralised intelligence gathering and reporting will culminate in centralised, authoritative, dynamic assessments to ensure that the politico-military authorities and the SACEUR share a common situational awareness. Operational and tactical commanders will also need intelligence to orchestrate fast moving, highly complex operations.
- b. To facilitate effective and timely planning, the NAC should be requested to authorise conducting intelligence activities no later than the approval of the Council Initiating Directive. This will enable SACEUR and the designated subordinate HQ(s) to initiate and conduct focussed intelligence activities. The development of proper plans will depend on the ability of the designated commander and staff to observe and accurately assess conditions within the operational area. At all times, this should take account of the geographical, cultural and ethnic environment, the history of the region, and the political and civil objectives and their place in the agreed division of responsibility.

0207. **Information Operations.** The nature of an NA5CRO highlights the critical importance of INFO OPS. Successful INFO OPS may avoid or minimise the need to conduct other military operations, and they should be considered as an essential tool in the success of NA5CROs and applied from the very early stages of any potential crisis situation.⁷ INFO OPS guidance should be sought from the NAC as early as possible. The aim of INFO OPS is to maximise the synergy of effort and, more importantly, to avoid any potential harm that could be caused by separate independent activities, operating at different levels, each unaware of the implications of their activities on others or on NATO's overall objectives. Therefore INFO OPS should be planned at the strategic and operational levels but practised at all levels. Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) and Electronic Warfare (EW) are elements of INFO OPS. INFO OPS are conducted in close co-ordination with Public Information (PI) and Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC).

0208. **Psychological Operations.** PSYOPS are an integral part of NA5CROs. Effective PSYOPS can help create a supportive atmosphere and a willingness to co-operate among the population in the crisis area. In an NA5CRO that typically does not involve the threat of force (e.g. humanitarian assistance and disaster relief), PSYOPS are a key element in explaining the purpose, scope, and duration of NATO's mission to the population. In an NA5CRO where the use or threat of force is more likely, PSYOPS are instrumental in undermining the adversary's, or a potential adversary's, readiness for conflict, will to fight, and his war-making capability, whilst gaining the support and co-operation of neutral and friendly audiences.

0209. **Electronic Warfare.** NA5CRO have already demonstrated the ability of EW to be a force multiplier when involved in Commander's decisions and correctly exploited. Electronic Warfare Support Measures, in fact, are essential for gathering tactical information to build-up a "recognized electronic picture" contributing to the overall situation awareness. Situation awareness is the cornerstone to realize effective engagement and FP, where EW again plays a primary role by a combination of Electronic Counter Measures and Electronic Protective Measures. Mid term strategic information can also be provided to J-2/Intelligence, representing the EW contribution to Signals Intelligence data collection. All the aforementioned activities are fundamental for the success of NA5CRO at tactical, operational and strategic levels and should be set-up from the very early stages of a potential crisis situation. In order to achieve effective EW support to NATO military Commanders, EW expertise within NFS HQs, as well as EW assets, must be identified in advance and be available early to ensure "mission-tailored" capability.

0210. **Public Information Implications.** NA5CROs will be conducted under close observation by the media and the public of NATO member nations as well as Partners and the population in the crisis area. The pace and capabilities of news reporting have evolved into instant, real-time coverage of military operations. Media images and words can have a profound effect on policy decisions at the highest level, as well as influencing public support, and the behaviour and attitude of local populations. Actions by individuals at the lowest level can attract significant media and local interest. This creates a need for a public information policy and sound planning at all levels. It requires an appropriate attitude and demands rapid communications and reporting through all levels of command. It is a continuous effort, which can contribute to the early defusing of a potential crisis, and requires unity of effort within the Alliance and among other participating organisations.

⁷ MC 422/1, *NATO Military Policy on Information Operations*, focuses on the need for continuous planning and co-ordination of related political and military capabilities.

0211. **Civil-Military Co-operation.** The interaction between the AJF and the civil environment, in which it operates, is crucial to the success of operations, and it is one of the most difficult challenges that NATO commanders at all levels will face. It is essential to establish liaison with the appropriate agencies, including civilian organizations, to ensure co-ordination in the mission area as soon as practical. Successful Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) requires effective interaction between the AJF and civil actors including international, national, and NGOs, and other agencies within the JOA and possibly beyond. The parameters for this co-operation will, ideally, be established between NATO and these organisations and agencies; however, ultimately, co-ordination can only be achieved by continuous consultation and liaison. Some of these organisations and agencies have permanent directives and agendas of their own which may conflict with the AJF main effort. Implementation of a civil plan in response to a crisis may be dependent on the AJF providing a stable and secure environment. The AJF should ensure coherence of CIMIC that should be co-ordinated with other activities throughout the JOA. Along with the normal planning factors for an operation the JFC must ensure that all overriding civil and political factors and considerations are taken into account. It is important that, where possible, military and civil actors identify and share common goals. Such goals, consistent with political guidance, should be integrated at an early stage in the planning of the campaign.

0212. **Arms Control.** International arms control treaties and confidence and security-building measures agreements are legally and/or politically binding. They apply not only in peacetime, but may also apply in times of tension and crisis. NATO, as an alliance, is not a signatory to such agreements, but forces assigned to it for collective military activity by member states nevertheless remain subject to the arms control commitments of their individual governments. It is therefore important that the Alliance is aware of these commitments and takes them into account during the course of concept and plan development, force activation, deployment, and while conducting NA5CROs.

0213. **Use of Force.** The use of force in an NA5CRO depends upon a complex mixture of rights and obligations that are codified by national legislation, customary international law, and the UN Charter. Commanders and their subordinates must be provided with, and adhere to, an unambiguous set of rules that define their rights and obligations in using military force. Amplifying direction on the use of force is usually given in the mission mandate and the authorised ROE. Only the precise, timely, measured, proportionate, and legal force sufficient to achieve the desired goal should be used. This does not preclude the inherent right of all Alliance armed forces to use force for self-defence. Self-defence is the use of such necessary and proportional force, including deadly force, to defend personnel and the nation against attack or an imminent attack. The following MC 362/1, *NATO Rules of Engagement* -based definitions apply in this context:

- "Necessary" means that use of force is indispensable for securing self-defence.
- "Proportional" means a response commensurate with the perception of the level of the threat posed. Any force used must be limited to the degree, intensity, and duration necessary for self-defence and no more.
- "Imminent" means that the need to defend is manifest, instant, and overwhelming.
- "Attack" is the use of force against NATO/NATO-led forces or NATO personnel or a NATO nation.

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0214. **Rules of Engagement.** ROE provide political direction, within legal parameters, and guidance to commanders at all levels governing the use of force. ROE will normally be developed as part of the OPLAN, which should result in a suitable set of ROE being available prior to the beginning of the campaign. However, the JFC needs to continually review the initial ROE upon arrival in the JOA and should submit specific ROE requests through NATO military authorities for approval by the NAC. The nature of NA5CROs can mean that the range of ROE needed may be more complex than those specified for traditional combat operations. The procedures for requesting, authorising, and implementing ROE are contained in MC 362/1, *NATO Rules of Engagement*. In order to maximise military effectiveness, it is crucial that multinational forces under NATO command operate under the same ROE if possible. However, it must be recognised that nations may have their own, more restrictive instructions in addition to the NATO ROE. Nations should inform the NAC if restrictions are in effect. The JFC must be aware of these additional national restrictions to maximize the employment capabilities of all forces under his command. The ROE should reflect the commander's intent and be developed in as much detail as possible.

0215. **Public Security.** The extent and complexity of military support to public security will depend on the mission and residual local policing and judicial capability in the JOA. NATO forces may face situations that extend from low-level reassurance in the short term to a worst case where the whole judicial structure and supporting law and order mechanisms have broken down. While civilian law enforcement is not normally a NATO function, the latter environment may require military involvement in civil public security tasks, including operations to maintain local law and order, during the initial stages of an operation until appropriate civilian authorities can resume their tasks.

0216. **Logistics and Host-Nation Support**

- a. Nations and the AJF have a collective responsibility for logistics. While nations ultimately bear the responsibility for the logistic support of their forces, the AJF establishes logistic requirements, co-ordinates logistic planning and support within the JOA, and subsequently monitors and co-ordinates the sustainment of forces assigned in accordance with agreed terms and conditions, in line with MC 319/1, *NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics* and AJP-4, *Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine*. The effectiveness of logistic support can be improved by the establishment of a Multinational Joint Logistics Centre (MJLC), in line with AJP-4.6, *Multinational Joint Logistic Centre Doctrine*, with responsibility for co-ordination and/or management of common logistic functions. This may be accomplished through a variety of support options including the establishment of Multinational Integrated Logistic Units. HNS may reduce the amount of logistic forces and materiel required to sustain and re-deploy forces. HNS will be provided on the basis of national legislation, priorities, and restrictions. In the context of an NA5CRO, all nations that provide transit support to NATO-led forces are considered HNs.

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- b. The primary task of the logistic staff, at all levels of command, is to develop and promulgate a logistic support concept of operations that supports the OPLAN. This logistic concept must include the identification of the structures and procedures available to reduce competition for scarce resources by nations and HQs, and the C2, and co-ordination arrangements between the multiple AJF-level logistic organisations, including those that interface with component commands. Given the numerous operational, geographic, and infrastructure-related factors which impact on the logistic system design, the need for designing an AJF logistic concept in advance is obvious. A well-supported MJLC may provide the best means by which the execution of the AJF logistic plan can be assured. It can be tailored to support various operational situations and requirements.

R 0217. **Legal Aspects.** NA5CROs will be initiated by an NAC Initiating Directive and executed in accordance with international law, including international humanitarian law, which applies in cases on international armed conflict. Commanders have a legal responsibility in accordance with national obligations and international legal statutes and agreements concerned with armed conflict and the law of war. Legal staffs advise the commander on these matters. However, in addition to fulfilling applicable legal requirements, commanders should always seek to minimise the effect of military operations on non-combatants.

0218. **Interoperability**

- a. Due to the increasing number of multinational formations involving Allied and PfP forces, interoperability within and between these formations is also an essential component of NA5CROs. Interoperability is, therefore, an integral part of NA5CRO planning and training.
- b. The effectiveness of Allied forces in peace, crisis, or in conflict depends on the ability of the forces provided to operate together effectively and efficiently. Allied joint operations should be prepared for, planned and conducted in a manner that makes the best use of the relative strengths and capabilities of the participating countries and the forces they offer for the operation. A common doctrine supported by standardisation of equipment and procedures, validated through participation in joint and multinational training exercises, provides the basis for the formations and units of a joint and multinational force to be able to work together. At the operational level, emphasis must be placed on the integration of the contributing nations' forces and the synergy that can be attained. This will have a significant effect on the ability of an AJF to achieve the commander's objectives.
- c. Forces assigned to an AJF will, to the extent possible, be expected to use standard NATO agreed doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. To achieve this, education and training may be necessary. In addition, one of the early tasks of a JFC would be to ascertain the degree of interoperability between the equipment and procedures of Alliance and other forces to make necessary arrangements to fully integrate the efforts of all participating units.

0219. **Faction Liaison and Joint Military Commissions.** In NA5CROs, commanders at all levels may need to communicate with their counterparts in the local armed forces and various paramilitary organisations, civilian factions, and governmental and non-governmental organisations in the region. This communication may be in the form of issuing directions for conducting day-to-day implementation of the terms of any agreement that form part of the AJF mission. Establishing a Joint Military Commission (JMC), Faction Liaison Office (FLO), or participating in Joint Civilian Committees (JCC) may further facilitate this liaison.

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- a. JMCs have become an important tool for the JFC to accomplish the mission. During an operation, commanders will find it necessary to bring together military and/or political leaders of protagonist factions to negotiate agreements, mediate disputes, and to secure the co-operation of all Parties.
- b. On the local level, establishing an FLO can provide a “hot-line” through which situations can be quickly defused or negotiations facilitated in a timely manner.
- c. Normally, the senior UN official (High Representative) will chair a JCC composed of senior political representatives of the Parties, the JFC or a representative, and representatives of civilian organisations.

0220. **Success.** In NA5CROs, success will generally be related to the achievement of pre-determined strategic objectives that are derived from the desired political end state and should be defined in the overall political mandate and the NAC Initiating Directive. The achievement of the political end state will be the defining criterion for the success of the entire operation, including the military mission. The achievement of related military objectives will usually be a precursor to attaining the political end state. The actual success of an operation will, therefore, be measured against the overall result and not just on the achievement of the military objectives.

CHAPTER 3

MILITARY CHARACTERISTICS OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

0301. **Introduction.** Operations in support of peace are recognised in MC 327/2, *NATO Military Policy for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations*, as an aspect of NA5CROs; however, in NATO, such operations are normally known as PSOs⁸. They are normally conducted in support of an internationally recognised organisation such as the UN or the OSCE and involve military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies. Where the nature of the operation allows, operations should be conducted impartially without favour or prejudice to any party. Effective communications and transparency of operations are a key to maintain an even-handed approach. PSOs are intended to achieve a long-term political settlement or other specified conditions. PSOs include PK and Peace Enforcement (PE) as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding, and humanitarian operations.

0302. **Strategic Context.** The international community responds to complex emergencies within a broad range of activities and according to the dimension of the crisis. These response options, which should be based on some type of legal mandate or authority, could range from humanitarian aid to the application of military force. Initially, more specific responses may be co-ordinated under the auspices of the UN or other organisations such as the OSCE. Should the response requirements escalate and need the deployment of a credible and capable military force, that option may be requested of an existing military alliance such as NATO or a coalition of willing states or a combination of both. Some development and relief agencies may have been operating in the area for several years before the crisis, and they will often play an important role as operations develop in an incremental and ad hoc fashion. The success of a PSO is largely dependent upon the support of the local population, local authorities where they exist, and the co-operation of the belligerent parties with the international community. The military task, in this context, will be to create the necessary secure conditions, and to provide support, within means and capabilities, to enable civilian agencies to address the underlying causes of the conflict and thus lead to a self-sustaining peace.

0303. **Principles of Peace Support Operations.** All military operations are conducted with a degree of restraint, which in some cases may only be an adherence to the Law of Armed Conflict. Where possible, PSOs are conducted in an impartial and even-handed manner. PSOs are designed so that the military forces create a secure environment in which civilian agencies can rebuild the infrastructure necessary to create a self-sustaining peace. In those cases where there is an agreement between the parties involved, Peace Support Force (PSF) actions are based upon judgments of the degree of compliance and/or non-compliance of the parties with that agreement and not against any bias or pre-determined designation. Both the mandate from the appropriate international authority, and the NAC decision should distinguish a PSO from any other enforcement action or war with a designated enemy, by specifying a desired political end state rather than the achievement of military victory.

⁸ AJP-3.4.1, *Peace Support Operations*

a. **Impartiality**

- (1) An aid to understanding impartiality is to view it from two related perspectives: as a guide to the conduct of the PSF, and as a perception of the belligerent parties. The conduct of a PSF should always be impartial and even-handed; if force is used against a particular party, it should only be because of what that party is doing (or not doing) in relation to the mandate/agreement between the parties, rather than because of who they are. The use of force, even when applied in an even-handed and impartial manner, is unlikely to be perceived as such—especially by any party that persistently transgresses. An analogy can help to relate impartiality to the conduct of operations: the impartial status of a legal system is not compromised because it only punishes the guilty, though that may not be the perception of a persistent criminal.
- (2) Impartiality must not be confused with neutrality. To do so limits flexibility and the potential to exercise initiative; it also promotes passivity and consequently limits the development of the mission. Impartiality requires a degree of judgement against a set of principles, or the mandate, or both, while the notion of neutrality implies not getting involved, staying out of something, or not taking any action. Conducting PSOs will be impartial to the parties but never neutral in the execution of the mission.

b. **Consent**

- (1) Whilst there may be consent at the strategic level (by virtue of national or party commitments to a peace agreement), at the tactical level there may be local groups who disagree to varying degrees with their leaders, and some may be openly hostile to the PSF. This may result in non-compliance by (para-) military elements of one or more of the parties, including (for example) attempts to restrict the freedom of movement of the PSF. In the aftermath of an inter-state conflict the degree of consent should be relatively clear-cut in a peace plan by the disputing States. In the event of an intra-state conflict or civil war, the warring factions may be difficult to differentiate from the general population, making judgements concerning consent highly problematic. Consent from the warring factions may be minimal and amount to nothing more than a false tolerance of the operation, while the rest of the population may be desperate for intervention and assistance. Should the level of consent be uncertain, and the potential for opposition exists, it would be prudent to deploy a force capable of enforcing compliance and promoting consent from the outset.
- (2) It is helpful if consent, like impartiality, is viewed from two perspectives. First, the emphasis that the PSF gives to the promotion and maintenance of consent is a determinant of the conduct of the PSF itself. Second, the perspective of the parties and indigenous population must be considered. Judgements concerning the level of consent should be made with reference to the permanence or fragility of consent; horizontally across all elements of the population and vertically within the hierarchies of the parties to the conflict.

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- (3) The promotion of co-operation and consent is fundamental to achieving the political end state in all PSOs. Without the active co-operation and consent of the parties and the indigenous population there cannot be a self-sustaining peace. The need to promote co-operation and consent and the long-term demands of peace will constrain the use of all military techniques and not just the use of force.

c. **Restraint in the Use of Force**

- (1) Restraint should always be exercised when applying force in PSOs. The degree of force necessary may be defined as the measured and proportionate application of force sufficient to achieve a specific objective. When used, force should be appropriate, proportionate, and designed to resolve and defuse a crisis and prevent further escalation. Only the appropriate and proportional level of force in relation to the aim must be used. Collateral damage should be minimised and all feasible precautions taken to avoid civilian casualties. The use of non-lethal weapons should be considered and used if possible and appropriate. Only appropriate and proportionate force should be used. This does not exclude the use of force sufficient to overwhelm, should it be necessary to do so.
- (2) Authoritative limits on the use of force may be established in the mandate/agreement between the parties as well as by international law, domestic law of the force providers and, in certain circumstances, HN law. They will be reflected in the NAC Initiating Directive and in approved ROE. The mere demonstration of the resolve and capability to use force may be all that is necessary.

0304. **Peace Support Operations**

- a. **Peacekeeping.** PK operations are generally undertaken in accordance with the principles of Chapter VI of the UN Charter to monitor and facilitate the implementation of a peace agreement. A loss of consent and a non-compliant party may limit the freedom of action of the PK force and even threaten the continuation of the mission. Thus the requirement to remain impartial, limit the use of force to self-defence, and maintain and promote consent, should guide the conduct of PK.
- b. **Peace Enforcement**
 - (1) PE operations normally take place under the principles of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. They are coercive in nature and are conducted when the consent of all Parties to the conflict has not been achieved or might be uncertain. They are designed to maintain or re-establish peace or enforce the terms specified in the mandate.
 - (2) The goal of PE missions is to enforce the provisions of a mandate designed to maintain or restore peace and order to allow the operations of a separately mandated PK force. It is emphasized, however, that transitioning a PK force to a PE force or vice versa should be avoided unless the unit is withdrawn from the operational area and undergoes proficiency training in the skills essential to satisfy the new mandate.

- c. **Conflict Prevention.** Conflict prevention activities are normally conducted in accordance with the principles of Chapter VI of the UN Charter. However, military deployments designed to deter and coerce parties will need to be credible, and this may require a combat posture and an enforcement mandate under the principles of Chapter VII. Conflict prevention activities may range from diplomatic initiatives, through efforts designed to reform a country's security sector and make it more accountable to democratic control, to preventative deployments of forces in support of diplomatic initiatives that are designed to prevent or contain disputes from escalating to armed conflict.
- d. **Peacemaking.** Peacemaking covers the diplomatic activities conducted after the commencement of a conflict, aimed at establishing a cease-fire or a rapid peaceful settlement. They can include the provision of good offices, mediation, conciliation, such actions as diplomatic pressure, isolation, sanctions, or other operations as directed by the NAC. Peacemaking is accomplished primarily by diplomatic means; however, military support is possible either directly or indirectly (e.g., staff support or planning).
- e. **Peacebuilding.** Peacebuilding covers actions that support political, economic, social and military measures aimed at strengthening political settlements of a conflict. This includes mechanisms to identify and support structures that tend to consolidate peace, foster a sense of confidence and well-being and support economic reconstruction. Peacebuilding therefore requires the commitment of humanitarian and development resources to a long-term political process.
- f. **Humanitarian Operations.** A humanitarian operation, within the context of or in support of a PSO, aims to alleviate human suffering where responsible authorities in an area are unable, or unwilling, to fully support a population. It may be conducted in the broader context of a PSO, or as an independent task, which may precede or accompany the humanitarian activities of specialised civilian organisations. Forces are assigned for a specific task in support of the co-ordinating humanitarian agency, and adopt a benign posture, except for FP measures.

CHAPTER 4

OTHER NON-ARTICLE 5 CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS AND TASKS

0401. **Introduction.** Military forces may be employed in NA5CRO scenarios that do not fall under the definition of PSOs. These are often undertaken by national military forces within a country's own borders, but Alliance forces may be called upon to assist. The NAC may agree to direct such operations, or they could be conducted within a bilateral or multinational context. Military involvement in these operations could range from support of humanitarian operations or disaster relief to enforcement of sanctions or embargoes.

0402. **Support of Humanitarian Operations.** A humanitarian operation is described as a mission conducted to alleviate human suffering, especially in circumstances where responsible authorities in the area are unable, or unwilling to provide adequate support to the population. In the framework of a NATO-led operation, Alliance forces could assume tasks in support of a humanitarian operation, but this would be by exception and upon request. These tasks may precede or accompany humanitarian activities provided by specialised civilian organisations. Such operations may be in response to earthquake, flood, famine, or manmade disasters such as radioactive, biological, or chemical contamination. They may also be a consequence of war or the flight from political, religious, or ethnic persecution. As humanitarian activities are basically a civilian task, military engagement would principally cover functions that cannot be assured in the required amount by these organisations. In conflicts where one side deliberately obstructs the delivery of supplies to its opponents, the requirement for military protection, such as convoy escort, to ensure the safe delivery of aid must be weighed against the dangers of intervention and politicising such aid. The two principal sub-categories of humanitarian operations are assistance for internally displaced persons and displaced persons and refugees (DPRE), and humanitarian operations.

a. **Assistance for Internally Displaced Persons and Displaced Persons and Refugees**

- (1) The purpose of assistance for internally displaced persons and DPRE is to provide the primary means of survival (water and hygiene, food, shelter, fuel, and medical care, including obstetrics and paediatrics), of large groups of people who—forced or by their own will—have left their initial home or place of habitual residence. This assistance may be requested because of a disaster or conflict situation. Formally, a distinction is made between displaced persons and refugees. Definitions for both are found in the Glossary.
- (2) Internally displaced person and DPRE assistance may include the support for camp organisation, basic construction and support of the administration, provision of care (food, supplies, medical, and protection), and support to placement (movement or relocation to other countries, camps, and locations). Although these operations may receive some support from NATO forces, the Alliance will seldom, if ever, conduct these operations. These are primarily under the purview of the IOs/NGOs.

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b. Humanitarian Operations

- (1) Humanitarian operations may be conducted in response to natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, or famines, or man-made disasters such as radioactive, biological, or chemical contamination. Humanitarian operations may also be conducted as consequence of conflict or the flight from political, religious, or ethnic persecution. A humanitarian operation may be conducted at the request of the HN, in the context of a PSO or as an independent task and may precede, accompany, or complement humanitarian activities provided by specialised civilian organisations. NATO military activities may support short-term tasks such as communications restoration, relief supply management, providing emergency medical care, humanitarian demining, and high priority relief supply delivery. They could also take the form of advice and selected training, assessments, and providing manpower and equipment.
- (2) Emergency relief concerns sustaining the means to safeguard life. Protecting human life is an inherent responsibility. Relief operations, in the narrow sense of the provision of aid, are principally the domain of humanitarian or aid agencies, whether UN or government, including host government (where one exists), NGOs and the civil sector. Military forces should be ready to assist in relief operations when the need for them arises, and to coordinate with other organisations concerned. Normally, military forces work to create the conditions in which these other agencies can operate more freely and effectively.
- (3) Military operations may be designed to provide emergency relief, delivery of aid supplies, or longer-term reconstruction assistance to aid agencies and the civil sector, including local communities. Relief operations should be conducted impartially.
- (4) Reconstruction activities are the responsibility of civilian agencies, however some military assistance may be needed to facilitate the transition from relief to reconstruction. Reconstruction assistance concerns the reconstruction of a life support infrastructure capable of providing such facilities as food, water, shelter, fuel, and other means of self-support and sustainment. Typically, such operations could involve digging wells, reconnecting water and electricity grid systems (where they exist), and rebuilding schools, hospitals, and communications networks. Should the military be required to assist in these functions at the outset, these tasks should transition from military to civilian responsibility at the earliest feasible point.
- (5) Should the situation be such that civilian humanitarian operations require widespread protection, specific tasks may include protecting convoys, depots, equipment, and those workers responsible for their operation.

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0403. **Support of Disaster Relief**

- a. Disaster relief is closely linked with humanitarian operations. As was previously stated, the disaster could be man-made or natural. Emergency relief concerns sustaining the means to safeguard life and requires very rapid reaction particularly where extremes of climate are encountered. NATO forces, such as the Standing Naval Forces, may be in the area as a result of an unrelated exercise or operation and could be diverted by direction of the NAC or MC; however, because of the need for speed, it is likely that immediate reaction will be provided unilaterally by nations. Disaster relief is more likely to take place within the context of an ongoing NA5CROs and much less likely as a stand-alone operation because of the requisite response times.⁹
- b. These missions include prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of disaster victims. Distribution of relief supplies has traditionally been the responsibility of the UN, NGOs, and IOs because of their charters, expertise, and experience. However, when the relief community is overwhelmed, NATO military forces may be requested to assist in distributing these supplies in accordance with the principles established in the “Oslo Guidelines” (*Guidelines on the use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief*, May 1994 and *Guidelines on the use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies*, December 2002). Potential relief roles for a NATO force include immediate response to prevent loss of life and destruction of property, constructing basic sanitation facilities and shelters, and providing food and medical care. Other missions might include C2, logistics, and communications, and the planning required to both initiate and sustain humanitarian operations.
- c. For disaster relief operations, an EADRCC has been established at NATO HQ. The Director of the Civil Emergency Planning Directorate heads the EADRCC with staff from a limited number of interested NATO and PfP countries as well as representatives from the NATO Military Authorities. The EADRCC is also open to representatives from the UN. It is responsible for coordinating, in close consultation with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the response of EAPC countries to a disaster occurring within the EAPC geographical area. The EADRCC could provide the core of a disaster assessment team that, in close co-operation with the emergency management agency of the stricken country and the UN resident coordinator, would identify requirements for international assistance.
- d. Disaster relief operations are usually conducted in a sequence of phases, some of which may be conducted concurrently. These are:
 - (1) Emergency Relief
 - (2) Sustained Relief
 - (3) Recovery

⁹ NATO policy on military support for disaster relief operations is outlined in MC 343, *NATO Military Assistance to International Disaster Relief Operations (IDRO)*.

(4) Rebuilding

(5) Sustained Rebuilding

(6) Return to Normalcy

Conducting disaster relief is primarily a responsibility of local civil authorities, possibly supported by IOs and NGOs. From a military perspective, however, each phase has its own characteristics and personnel and materiel requirements.

0404. Search and Rescue

- a. SAR¹⁰ is “the use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, specialised rescue teams, and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea.” All NATO nations are signatories to the Chicago Conventions of 1947 on International Civil Aviation, and the International Convention on Maritime SAR of 1979, and, under these conventions, have agreed to adhere to overall policies, procedures, and minimum standards in SAR. The operational aspects of this responsibility are discharged by nations, each nation being responsible for SAR within an area, or a number of areas, called Search and Rescue Regions (SRRs) in which SAR operations are controlled by Rescue Co-ordination Centres (RCCs).
- b. SAR and the provision of facilities are a national responsibility. In time of conflict, the existing SAR organisation would continue to be used whenever possible. However, NATO commanders are responsible for the planning and conduct of local SAR for forces under their command. Such SAR operations would be conducted in conjunction with local RCCs in accordance with the doctrinal guidance contained in Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-10, *Search and Rescue*. Local SAR procedures should take into account such factors as weather, terrain, SAR craft range/performance, threat to own forces, survivor contact, the availability of tactical support aircraft, and established national procedures and facilities in the SRR(s) within which the operation is being conducted.
- c. In addition to delegating responsibility to recover personnel to component commanders, AJF commanders should consider establishing an RCC to monitor recovery efforts; plan, co-ordinate, and execute combined joint SAR operations.
- d. Joint SAR operations are those that have exceeded the capabilities of the component commanders in their own operations and require the efforts of two or more components of the NATO force to accomplish the mission.

¹⁰ Combat Search and Rescue may also be conducted in support of various types of NA5CRO, such as PE, NEO, or Extraction Operations, but does not constitute a type of NA5CRO in itself.

0405. **Support to Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations**

- a. It is important to note that NEOs are diplomatic initiatives—with Alliance forces participating in a supporting role. NEOs may be described as operations conducted to relocate (to a place of safety) non-combatants threatened in a foreign country. Generally a force committed to a NEO should have the capability to provide security, crowd control when required, reception and control, movement and emergency medical support for the civilians, and unarmed military personnel to be evacuated. Normally, Alliance forces would only support NEO in the framework of a NATO-led operation and that support would not include the evacuation of nationals, which remains a national responsibility; however, nations could conduct NEO for their nationals on a bi- or multi-national basis using NATO doctrine.
- b. NEOs can be characterised by the environment in which they are conducted. NEOs are likely to be conducted in a deteriorating security situation at a time when there is intense diplomatic activity to prevent conflict from occurring. Besides their primary objectives as a crisis management tool, NEOs may signal both international concern and a limited demonstration of intent. If not previously established, a NATO AJF assigned NEO responsibilities should be formed in sufficient time to allow specific mission logistics support, planning, training, and co-ordinated rehearsals prior to deployment.
- c. **Ministries of State.** At all levels, military and diplomatic personnel need to cooperate to successfully execute NEOs. This is most important at the ambassador and command level and includes their staffs and all other personnel. While the protection of citizens being evacuated remains paramount, evacuation operations will probably be conducted in an environment where political considerations and constraints will be more important than in most other types of military operations. In most cases, NEO participants will not be actively engaged militarily against the forces posing a threat to the non-combatants. Military action will therefore be determined by the situation. Political constraints may also be imposed on the introduction of Allied military personnel into a country prior to an evacuation operation, thus hampering planning and preparation. Every attempt should be made to cooperate, without compromising mission needs, with diplomatic personnel, for they can keep NATO forces fully apprised of the situation and are influential for coordinating actions that greatly affect the NEO. These actions include political constraints on the commanders, legal issues, agreements, rights, privileges, and immunities (if any) within the HN, the Forward Mounting Base, and the safe haven.
- d. **Diplomatic Organization.** Nations participating in NEOs may choose to establish an ad hoc NEO oversight organization chaired by a senior diplomat. Representatives of the defence ministries, senior NATO military officers, and representatives from other appropriate departments and agencies of the participating governments are potential members. The group might resemble the Joint Civilian Committee in PSOs. This group's responsibility is to ensure the coordination of planning and implementation of plans of the diplomatic and military elements for the protection or evacuation of non-combatants. Representatives of this oversight group are points of contact for their respective elements on all matters pertaining to emergency and evacuation planning.

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- e. **Liaison.** Liaison groups may be established on the recommendation of the NEO oversight organization to ensure co-ordination of planning in the field, and provide advice and guidance in operational planning and execution. These groups brief and assist in the co-ordination and planning of the evacuation or protection of non-combatants and other designated persons in case of emergency. They will normally consist of diplomatic representatives, local government representatives, third country nationals, and host-country personnel. Liaison in NEOs is of paramount importance and specific care should be given to the nomination and selection of the individuals.
- f. **Potential Environments for Conducting Support to NEO**
- (1) **Permissive.** NEOs conducted in a permissive environment would most commonly occur following a natural disaster or civil unrest. Under these conditions no resistance to the evacuation is expected. In such circumstances there will be HN consent and most likely HNS for the evacuation of those wishing to leave. Although military resources are unlikely to be required to provide security, they may be needed for logistic support such as emergency medical treatment and transportation. Commanders and their staffs should monitor and evaluate the situation closely and plan for a range of contingencies, including a deteriorating situation and descent into an uncertain or hostile environment.
 - (2) **Uncertain.** NEOs conducted in an uncertain environment would most commonly occur following an insurrection, when the HN government does not have effective control of the territory and/or population in an area containing potential evacuees. There are often elements, armed or unarmed, organised or disorganised, which create a climate of insecurity and a threat to potential evacuees. Under these circumstances, the HN government has effective control of the majority of its security forces and is not expected to interfere with the conduct of an operation. However, HNS is less likely to be available or reliable. Planning for an operation conducted in an uncertain environment must anticipate the possibility of escalation to a hostile environment.
 - (3) **Hostile.** NEOs conducted in a hostile environment would most commonly occur when the HN civil and military authorities have lost control, ceased to function altogether, or directly oppose evacuation. Such circumstances might include a general breakdown of law and order. Potential evacuees may be directly targeted and their lives increasingly threatened. The HN security forces cannot be expected to support, and may even obstruct, the operation. In such an environment, NATO forces must be prepared for a wide range of contingencies.
- g. **Tasks.** NATO military forces would normally conduct security tasks, assist evacuee reception and control, secure movement routes, and provide temporary emergency medical support in support of NEOs.
- (1) **Security.** Security forces are used as necessary at the evacuation points, Evacuation Control Centre (ECC) perimeter, landing zones, aircraft staging and/or parking areas, and landing sites for naval landing craft. Security forces could also provide a reaction force if other units encounter difficulty or require assistance.

- (2) **Reception and Control.** Evacuee processing may take place at an air terminal, aboard ship, or at another temporary safe haven site. NATO forces' primary duties could include maintaining order in the evacuation sites and supporting the efforts to care for non-combatant evacuees.
- (3) **Movement.** NATO forces could move to and secure pre-designated reception centres, ensure safe passage of evacuees to the reception centres, and escort them to an ECC. The size of the Allied force will be dependent on the number of sites, evacuees anticipated, and potential threat.
- (4) **Emergency Medical Support.** The AJF may be requested to provide temporary emergency medical assistance, within its capabilities, until adequate civilian medical facilities are established. Modifications to field medical equipment sets may be required to support the composition of personnel being evacuated (such as paediatric, obstetrical, and geriatric).

0406. **Extraction Operations.** Extraction operations may be described as missions where a NATO-led force covers or assists in the withdrawal of a UN or other military mission from a crisis region. A force committed to an extraction operation should have similar capabilities to those required by a force operating in support of NEO and should include the necessary assets for transporting the personnel to be extracted. An extraction operation is likely to be conducted in an uncertain or hostile environment. In general, these conditions are similar to those pertaining in the previous instances of NEO. In a hostile environment, a loss of consent for the presence of a UN or other mission could occur or the HN government may not have effective control of the territory in question. Under these circumstances, planning must anticipate a potential need for a NATO extraction force. In the past, NATO has established extraction forces, on a temporary basis, to enhance the safety of international missions.

0407. **Military Aid/Support to Civil Authorities.** Military aid/support to civil authorities embraces all those military activities that provide temporary support to civil communities or authorities, when permitted by law, and which are normally undertaken when unusual circumstances or an emergency overtakes the capabilities of the civil authorities.

- a. **Support to Civil Authorities.** Implementation of a civil plan in response to a crisis may depend on the military to provide a stable and secure environment for its implementation. Support might include providing security assistance to an election process and supervising the transition to a democratically elected public administration, training local police and security forces, mine and unexploded ordnance clearing and training of the local population, assisting in public administration, maintaining public services, supporting public administration in co-ordinating a humanitarian operation, or providing security for individuals, populations, or installations.
- b. **Public Security.** In exceptional circumstances, within a mandate for a larger mission, NATO military forces could be called on to contribute to tasks related to public security which are the responsibility of a mandated civil authority, organisation, or agency. Specifically, military support to public security will depend entirely on the mission and the residual local policing and judicial capability, and may require involvement in civil security tasks, including operations to maintain local law and order during the initial stage of an operation, until appropriate civilian authorities can take over their tasks. This assistance will normally be provided by Multinational Specialised Units, or in special circumstances, by other forces.

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c. **Engineer Support**

- (1) NATO engineer forces contribute significantly to many NA5CROs, especially during humanitarian and disaster relief operations. The level of assistance can vary from small, highly specialized teams to complete engineer units. Small teams may be used to assess damage or estimate engineering repairs, and can assist in specialized support such as power supply and distribution, utilities repair work, water purification, and well drilling operations.
- (2) In large humanitarian and disaster relief operations, Alliance engineer units provide essential civil, electrical, and mechanical engineering support including facility construction, structural repair, debris clearance, emergency repairs to restore utilities, and camp construction for deployed forces and dislocated civilians.
- (3) Examples of NATO specialized engineering support capabilities may include the following:

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fire protection and crash rescue • FP measures • Mine clearance and counter obstacle operations • Explosive ordnance disposal • Threat planning and basic response to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction and hazardous materials • Support to Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical decontamination and recovery operations • Water well drilling • Water treatment • Power generation • Route maintenance and repair • Bridging • Railway construction and repair 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Runway construction and repair • Pavement evaluation and analysis • Asphalt and concrete plant operations • Quarry operations • Port openings • Underwater construction and salvage • Specialized building construction Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems • POL infrastructure • Baseline and final environmental assessments, environmental protection and remediation, if necessary • Terrain analysis • Geodetic survey control
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0408. **Enforcement of Sanctions and Embargoes.** In broad terms, the enforcement of sanctions and embargoes is designed to force a nation to obey international law or to conform to a resolution or mandate. Sanctions generally concern the denial of supplies, diplomatic, economic, and other trading privileges, and the freedom of movement of those living in the area of sanctions. Sanctions may be conducted partially against a particular party, or impartially, in the context of a PSO, over a wide area embracing all parties. The military objective is to establish a barrier that is selective, allowing only those goods authorised to enter or exit. Depending on geography, sanction enforcement normally involves some combination of air, land, and maritime forces. Assigned forces should be capable of complementary mutual support and full communications compatibility. Examples are embargoes, maritime interdiction operations, and the enforcement of no-fly zones.

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- a. **Embargoes.** An embargo means a prohibition or restriction on the entry or exit of goods, persons, and services into and/or from States through sea- or airports or across land. Today, the term is generally associated with sanctions that prohibit the movement of specific cargoes in and out of a territory. Enforcement of embargoes normally involves maritime interdiction operations. Maritime roles include operations to locate, classify, and track surface vessels, submarines, and aircraft, and, if necessary, to apply force against them. They may also include embargoes against economic or military shipping, or denial of the sea areas to an adversary's military operations. In addition to air and maritime assets, NATO land and special operations forces have capabilities such as unmanned aerial vehicle surveillance, border reconnaissance, and electronic intelligence support that may be employed in support of embargoes. Embargoes have several distinct advantages over other compelling measures involving hostile actions and are conducted to resolve disputes through measures short of armed conflict, while allowing limited and controlled force to be used, if necessary. If tensions rise, the affected nation's warfighting ability can be diminished by an effective embargo on military supplies.
- b. **Maritime Interdiction Operations.** Maritime interdiction operations (MIO) encompass seaborne enforcement measures to intercept the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specific area. MIO are normally restricted to the interception and, if necessary, boarding of vessels to verify, re-direct or impound their cargoes in support of the enforcement of economic or military sanctions. The extreme form of MIO is known as a blockade.
- c. **No-Fly Zones.** Enforcing a no-fly zone that has been established by mandate of a sanctioning body is a unique mission that involves preventing a Party from flying in certain airspace. The no-fly zone could be above a Party's territory or in a neighbouring country. Usually, a NATO mission involves working with several types of aircraft from various nations and different Services. No-fly zone enforcement can involve friendly, adversary, and neutral fixed- and/or rotary-wing aircraft. Typically, no-fly zone enforcement is a Defensive Counter Air mission involving Combat Air Patrols and/or Interception supported by surveillance and C2 assets. However, depending on the specific scenario and the threat to own forces, Offensive Counter Air operations such as Suppression of Enemy Air Defences or attack operations on adversary installations may be required.

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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

AJF	Allied Joint Force
AJP	Allied Joint Publication
ATP	Allied Tactical Publication
C2	Command and Control
CC	Component Command
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIMIC	Civil-Military Co-operation
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
COG	Centre of Gravity
DPRE	Displaced Persons and Refugees
EADRCC	Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
ECC	Evacuation Control Centre
EU	European Union
EW	Electronic Warfare
FLO	Faction Liaison Office
FP	Force Protection
HN	Host-nation
HNS	Host-nation Support
HQ	Headquarters
INFO OPS	Information Operations
IO	International Organisation
JCC	Joint Civilian Commission
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JMC	Joint Military Commission
JOA	Joint Operations Area
MC	Military Committee
MIO	Maritime Interdiction Operations
MJLC	Multinational Joint Logistics Centre
NA5CRO	Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operation
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBC	Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
NCA	NATO Command Arrangements
NCS	NATO Command Structure
NEO	Non-combatant Evacuation Operation
NFS	NATO Force Structure

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NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NNTCN	Non-NATO Troop Contributing Nation
NRF	NATO Response Force
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PE	Peace Enforcement
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PI	Public Information
PK	Peacekeeping
PMF	Political Military Framework
POL	Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
PSF	Peace Support Force
PSO	Peace Support Operation
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
RCC	Rescue Co-ordination Centre
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander in Europe
SAR	Search and Rescue
SOR	Statement of Requirement
SRR	Search and Rescue Region
UN	United Nations
UNSC	UN Security Council

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

alliance

The result of formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of its members. In NATO documents, when the word “alliance” is capitalised, it refers specifically to NATO. (This entry will be processed for inclusion in AAP-6 upon ratification of this publication)

Allied joint operation

An operation carried out by forces of two or more NATO nations, in which elements of more than one Service participate. (AAP-6)

Allied joint publication

A publication of joint interest containing doctrine applicable to NATO-led multinational forces, conducting operations involving more than one Service. It is used by commanders of Allied joint forces, their subordinate commanders and staffs. (AAP-3)

area of operations

An operational area defined by a joint commander for land or maritime forces to conduct military activities. Normally, an area of operations does not encompass the entire joint operations area of the joint commander, but is sufficient in size for the joint force component commander to accomplish assigned missions and protect forces. (AAP-6)

campaign

A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land, and air forces. (AAP-6)

civil-military cooperation

The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies. (AAP-6)

coalition

A temporary alliance. (Concise Oxford Dictionary, Tenth Edition)

collective defence

Provisions of the Washington Treaty, particularly to the reciprocal undertaking made in Article 5—namely to consider an attack against one or more Allied nations as an attack upon them all. (This entry will be processed for inclusion in AAP-6 upon ratification of this publication)

combined / multinational

Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organizations, in which elements of more than one nation participate. *Also called "multinational".* (AAP-6)

combined joint operation

An operation carried out by forces of two or more nations, in which elements of at least two Services participate. (AAP-6)

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combined joint task force

A multinational (combined) and joint task force, task-organised and formed for the full range of the Alliance's military missions, which the commander of the combined joint task force commands from a multinational and joint headquarters. The joint task force may include elements from non-NATO troop contributing nations. Also called a **CJTF**. (This entry will be processed for inclusion in AAP-6 upon ratification of this publication)

conflict prevention

A peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and - when necessary - military means, to monitor and identify the causes of conflict, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities. *See also peacebuilding; peacekeeping; peacemaking; peace support operation.* (AAP-6)

disaster

A sudden accident or a natural catastrophe that causes great damage or loss of life. (Concise Oxford Dictionary, Tenth Edition)

displaced person

A civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundaries of his or her country. (This entry will be processed for inclusion in AAP-6 upon ratification of this publication)

doctrine

Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application. (AAP-6)

embargo

An official ban, especially on trade or other commercial activity, with a particular country. (Concise Oxford Dictionary, Tenth Edition)

evacuee

A person who has been ordered or authorized to move from a place of danger by competent authorities, and whose movements and accommodation are planned, organized, and controlled by such authorities. (AAP-6)

extraction operations

Operations where a NATO-led force covers or assists in the withdrawal of a UN or other military missions from a crisis region. (This entry will be processed for inclusion in AAP-6 upon ratification of this publication)

host nation

A nation which, by agreement: a. receives forces and materiel of NATO or other nations operating on/from or transiting through its territory; b. allows materiel and/or NATO organizations to be located on its territory; and/or c. provides support for these purposes. *See also host-nation support.* (AAP-6)

host-nation support

Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis or war by a host-nation to NATO and/or other forces and NATO organisations that are located on, operating on/from, or in transit through the host-nation's territory. (AAP-6)

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humanitarian operation

An operation specifically mounted to alleviate human suffering where responsible civil actors in an area are unable or unwilling to adequately support a population. It may precede, parallel, or complement the activity of specialised civil humanitarian agencies. (This entry will be processed for inclusion in AAP-6 upon ratification of this publication)

internally displaced person

A person who, as part of a mass movement, has been forced to flee his or her home or place of habitual residence suddenly or unexpectedly as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violation of human rights, fear of such violation, or natural or man-made disasters, and who has not crossed an internationally recognized State border. *See also evacuee; refugee.* (AAP-6)

international organisation

Institutions with global influence, such as the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross/Crescent. Also called **IO**. (This entry will be processed for inclusion in AAP-6 upon ratification of this publication)

joint force commander

A general term applied to a commander authorised to exercise command authority or operational control over a joint force. (This entry will be processed for inclusion in AAP-6 upon ratification of this publication)

joint operations area

A temporary area defined by a NATO strategic or regional commander, in which a designated joint commander plans and executes a specific mission at the operational level of war. Note: it is defined in coordination with nations and approved by the North Atlantic Council or the Military Committee as appropriate, in accordance with NATO's Operational Planning Architecture. A joint operations area and its defining parameters, such as time, scope of the mission and geographical area, are contingency - or mission - specific and may overlap areas of responsibility. (AAP-6)

maritime interdiction operations

Seaborne enforcement measures to intercept the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specific area. (This entry will be processed for inclusion in AAP-6 upon ratification of this publication)

national command

A command that is organised by, and functions under, the authority of, a specific nation. It may or may not be placed under a NATO commander. (AAP-6)

national component/contingent

Any national forces of one or more Services under the command of a single national commander, assigned to any NATO commander. (AAP-6)

no-fly zone

An air exclusion zone established by a sanctioning body to prohibit specified activities in a specific geographic area. (This entry will be processed for inclusion in AAP-6 upon ratification of this publication)

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Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations

Multifunctional operations, falling outside the scope of Article 5, that encompass those political, military, and civil activities, initiated and executed in accordance with international law, including international humanitarian law, contributing to conflict prevention and resolution, and crisis management in the pursuit of declared Alliance objectives. They range from support operations that are primarily associated with civil agencies through operations in support of peace to Alliance combat operations. (This entry will be processed for inclusion in AAP-6 upon ratification of this publication)

non-combatant evacuation operation

An operation conducted to relocate designated non-combatants threatened in a foreign country to a place of safety. (AAP-6)

non-governmental organisation

A transnational organisation of private citizens that maintains a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Non-governmental organisations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). Also called **NGO**. (This entry will be processed for inclusion in AAP-6 upon ratification of this publication)

operation

A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (AAP-6)

operational area

An overarching term for geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. (This entry will be processed for inclusion in AAP-6 upon ratification of this publication)

operational control

The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control. (AAP-6)

operational level of war

The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations. (AAP-6)

peacebuilding

A peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil and - when necessary - military means, to address the underlying causes of conflict and the longer-term needs of the people. It requires a commitment to a long-term process and may run concurrently with other types of peace support operations. *See also conflict prevention; peacekeeping; peacemaking; peace support operation.* (AAP-6)

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peace enforcement

A peace support operation conducted to maintain a cease-fire or peace agreement where the level of consent and compliance is uncertain and the threat of disruption is high. The peace support force must be capable of applying credible coercive force and must apply the provisions of the cease-fire or peace agreement impartially. *See also conflict prevention; peacebuilding; peacekeeping; peacemaking; peace support operation.* (AJP-3.4 Custodial Meeting, August 2003. This entry will be processed for inclusion in AAP-6 upon ratification of this publication.)

peacekeeping

A peace support operation following an agreement or ceasefire that has established a permissive environment where the level of consent and compliance is high, and the threat of disruption is low. The use of force by peacekeepers is normally limited to self-defence. *See also conflict prevention; peacebuilding; peacemaking; peace support operation.* (AAP-6)

peacemaking

A peace support operation, conducted after the initiation of a conflict to secure a ceasefire or peaceful settlement, that involves primarily diplomatic action supported, when necessary, by direct or indirect use of military assets. *See also conflict prevention; peacebuilding; peacekeeping; peace support operation.* (AAP-6)

peace support operation

An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and/or humanitarian operations. *See also conflict prevention; peacebuilding; peacekeeping; peacemaking.* (AAP-6)

public information

Information which is released or published for the primary purpose of keeping the public fully informed, thereby gaining their understanding and support. (AAP-6)

refugee

Any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (UN) *See also evacuee; internally displaced person.* (AAP-6)

rules of engagement

Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (AAP-6)

search and rescue

The use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, specialised rescue teams, and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea. (AAP-6)

strategic level of war

The level of war at which a nation or group of nations determines national or multinational security objectives and deploys national, including military, resources to achieve them. (AAP-6)

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tactical level of war

The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical formations and units. (AAP-6)

transfer of authority

Within NATO, an action by which a member nation or NATO Command gives operational command or control of designated forces to a NATO Command. (AAP-6)

REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS

MC 133/3	NATO's Operational Planning System
MC 317/1	The NATO Force Structure
MC 319	NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics
MC 324/1	The NATO Military Command Structure
MC 326/1	Medical Support Principals and Policies
MC 327/2	NATO Military Policy for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations
MC 336/2	NATO Principles and Policies for Movement and Transportation
MC 343	NATO Military Assistance to International Disaster Relief Operations
MC 348	NATO Command and Control Warfare Policy
MC 362/1	NATO Rules of Engagement
MC 389/1	Military Committee Policy on NATO's Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Capability
MC 400/2	MC Guidance for the Military Implementation of the Alliance Strategy
MC 402	NATO Psychological Operations Policy
MC 411/1	NATO Civil-Military Co-operation Policy
MC 422/1	NATO Military Policy on Information Operations
MC 458	NATO Training, Exercises, and Evaluation Policy
MC 477	Military Concept for the NATO Response Force

Bi-SC Force Protection Directive 80-25, 1 January 2003

Bi-SC Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP)

AAP-6	NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French)
AAP-15	NATO Glossary of Abbreviations Used in NATO Documents and Publications
AJP-01	Allied Joint Doctrine
AJP-3	Allied Joint Operations
AJP-3.4.1	Peace Support Operations
AJP-3.7	NATO Psychological Operations Doctrine
AJP-3.8	Allied Joint Doctrine for NBC Defence
AJP-4	Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine
AJP-4.6	Multinational Joint Logistic Centre (MJCL) Doctrine
AJP-4.10	Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine
AJP-9	NATO Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) Doctrine
ATP-10	Search and Rescue

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